Policing, Projects, and Partnerships: How the U.S. Can Compete with China in Oceania

By. Theodore Headlee

DOI: 10.57912/28756325

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Once characterized by President Dwight Eisenhower as part of an “American lake,” Oceania has been safely under American hegemony for decades. However, recent years have seen growing Chinese investments alongside attempts to establish a regional security presence. These trends represent serious challenges to America’s regional standing and allow China to jeopardize U.S. military operations in the event of a significant crisis. Within this context of heightened competition, the U.S. military can stem China’s growing influence in Oceania by partnering with regional governments and longstanding allies to provide development and security alternatives to China.

China has embarked on numerous economic and security efforts in Oceania to enlarge its regional presence. Ten Pacific island nations have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative for economic development, and China has since helped fund an array of projects, including airports in Samoa and Kiribati, several government buildings in Vanuatu, and an offer of $1 billion in development aid to support the soon-to-be independent island of Bougainville. In addition to the now frequent concerns that China’s projects are fiscally irresponsible, leaving partners economically dependent on China, and doing little to improve the economic well-being of recipient nations, there is an added worry that infrastructure projects like Kiribati and Samoa’s airports could complement China’s efforts to expand its security presence in the region. The Solomon Islands signed security agreements in 2022 and 2023 that permitted China to train local officers and deploy security forces in an emergency. Kiribati has likewise signed a policing deal leading to Chinese officers being stationed there.

While Pacific island nations are free to enter into security arrangements with partners of their choosing, the U.S. should be concerned about how a growing Chinese security presence in the region could threaten American national security. As demonstrated by how China’s naval base in Djibouti evolved from a civilian port, China may seek to build off commercial projects abroad to project power and secure Belt and Road Initiative projects. If China were to follow a similar playbook in the Pacific, the consequences for American national security would be significant. China’s investments and security presence in Kiribati could lead to the closure or denial of islands and airspace the U.S. would need in an armed confrontation with China. In the case of the Solomon Islands’ recent agreement with China, a future crisis could see Chinese forces in the country well positioned to interfere with American lines of communication with Australia, leading to greater difficulties in coordinating a response with one of America’s most capable Pacific allies. Therefore, keeping up with China in Oceania goes beyond simply maintaining close ties in a region with an increasing number of Chinese partnerships. Instead, America must recognize that it is in a regional competition with strategic consequences for its military forces across the Indo-Pacific.

To maintain security and a leading role in Oceania, the U.S. must balance countering China, ensuring the region stays secure for U.S. operations in the Pacific, and supporting the economic development of island nations. Fortunately, several options are available for the U.S. to accomplish all three objectives. On the security side, the U.S. can continue to expand the Coast Guard’s presence in Oceania. The Coast Guard can help ensure the region’s maritime and air routes remain secure for U.S. forces while freeing up the Navy’s more heavily armed warships for deployment to waters in the Western Pacific closer to China. With 11 “shiprider agreements” that allow local law enforcement officials to join Coast Guard ships for maritime patrols, the Coast Guard can provide the region with a non-military alternative to security that rivals China’s policing assistance. Not only would such agreements help the Coast Guard improve America’s defense presence in Oceania, they would also strengthen Pacific governments by providing them additional means and capable partners in their efforts to counter transnational drug trafficking, gambling, and illegal fishing operations in the region. By using the Coast Guard to partner with Pacific nations, the U.S. can provide a more reliable security presence that is proportional to the region’s security issues and conserves America’s strength for fights elsewhere. 

In addition to the Coast Guard, the Seabees, the Navy’s construction units, can improve America’s presence in Oceania by addressing regional development issues. Seabees have started working on airfield and port construction projects in the Pacific to help U.S. forces disperse and resupply in the event of war with China. They have also been present for humanitarian missions across the wider Indo-Pacific, ranging from building medical clinics in Timor-Leste to constructing water facilities and disaster preparedness centers in the Marshall Islands. By partnering with the Navy’s civil affairs officer and national governments to build roads, ports, schools, and tsunami warning systems, the Seabees could solidify U.S. military access throughout Oceania, consolidate support for America’s presence, and build trust with local communities. 

Finally, the U.S. should leverage the decades’ worth of allies it has built within and around Oceania. America maintains Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreements with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau that provide each nation economic support and security guarantees. In return, each state grants the U.S. military access and a say over which third parties can also be given military access. However, congressional delays last year jeopardized funding and America’s COFA agreements. To ensure that America maintains some of its strongest and most comprehensive partnerships in the region, the U.S. should at a minimum avoid running the risk of letting future COFA agreements run out. The U.S. should also cooperate with its larger Pacific allies and their responses to China’s actions. Australia, long seen as one of the region’s most trusted security partners, agreed in August to a $400 million policing initiative to support local police units and establish a regional crisis reaction force. In addition to the policing initiative, Australia promised to help Papua New Guinea refurbish old ports and entered into an agreement with Nauru to invest in telecommunications, security, and banking in return for getting a say over the island nation’s infrastructure and security partners. Japan, too, has been stepping up its involvement with offers to deploy more aircraft and ships to the region and give fishing research ships to several countries to improve fishery monitoring. 

The efforts America’s allies have put into Oceania’s security are commendable and complement the U.S.’ goal of giving the region partners other than China to work with. However, the U.S. and its allies could all benefit from a more coordinated vision that allows each state to focus on specific aspects of competition. For example, the U.S. and Japan could prioritize maritime patrolling and infrastructure, while Australia could provide ground policing and economic investment. Such a framework would help the U.S., Australia, and Japan synchronize efforts to counter China, allow for the pooling of resources to address the region’s most pressing issues, and send a powerful message to China that the Pacific’s democracies are capable of cooperating in several different fields to address a shared threat.

Despite the balance of power in Oceania changing, the region’s importance to U.S. military planning and national security is not. To ensure that the U.S. can still serve its own security needs and those of Oceanic states, U.S. military cooperation with allies in and around the region can play a leading role in providing economic and security solutions through infrastructure construction, policing, and maritime patrols. Doing so could make the region a testament to America’s ability to rally allies and offer mutually beneficial security and economic partnerships in the face of growing competition.