Operation Spiderweb: Lessons for Protecting America’s Bomber Fleet

By. Alexander Aznavoorian

DOI. 10.57912/30320059

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June 1^st, 2025, will forever be known as the Russian Pearl Harbor. After over a year of planning, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) launched a coordinated attack against 5 Strategic Russian airbases. This strike targeted some of the Russian Air Force’s most expensive and irreplaceable assets, including its long-range strategic bombers and airborne early-warning and control (AWACS) type planes. All told, up to 34% of Russia’s Strategic Bomber fleet was damaged or destroyed. Critically, Ukraine was able to carry out this attack without the use of standoff cruise missiles or stealthy aircraft, rather using first-person view (FPV) drones launched from the back of trucks. This attack highlighted just how vulnerable airbases and other military sites can be, and should serve as a warning to the United States that even distance can’t protect strategic assets.

Operation Spiderweb was the culmination of years of planning, infiltration, and waiting by the SBU. FPV drones, communications equipment, and explosive charges were gradually smuggled into Russia. Warehouses in central Russia served as production facilities, where the FPV drones were assembled and launch platforms disguised to resemble truck-hauled mobile homes. The SBU even claims to have had its operational command center within Russia’s border, next to a regional FSB headquarters. On the day of the attacks, the SBU duped Russian truck drivers into driving their drone-laden cargo right next to their targets. When the order was given, the roofs automatically opened and the drones flew towards their targets, who were sitting openly on their hardstands. The Ukrainian drones were flown by pilots located in Ukraine, using simple 4G networks to link to and control the drones to ensure all Ukrainian personnel were safely outside of Russia on the day of the attacks. Once the operation was completed, the trucks that were used as launch platforms self-destructed. 

The reaction throughout the West was one of jubilation, with even President Trump, a Ukraine skeptic, privately hailing the attacks as “badass”. However, the success of Operation Spiderweb could very well be replicated against American bases, both abroad and at home. Over the past several months, both Russia and China have been using drones to surveil American military installations in Europe and in the mainland United States. On one such occasion, a Chinese national flew a drone over Vandenberg Space Force Base in California during the launch of a military satellite. Both China and Russia have also been investing heavily in FPV production and experimenting with containerization technology. Containerization would enable either to pack a generic shipping container that is indistinguishable from other commercial ones, full of FPV drones, without raising any alarms. This shipping container could sit idly in a port or truck park for months until activated, likely during a conflict. The container would finally be relocated right next to a major military installation unnoticed, using commercial trucks and truckers, just as the Ukrainians did. 

China and Russia have numerous incentives to carry out such a plan. Russia has used a large number of standoff weapons in Ukraine, limiting the size and ability of its offensive arsenal to hold NATO bases at risk. China could view containerized FPV drones as a cost-effective complement to its burgeoning ballistic missile capabilities, particularly in light of massive American investment in air defenses. Most of all, both lack the ability to project and sustain major conventional military forces in North America. Containerized FPV drones could be seen as a cheap, available, and low-risk way to hold American and allied military bases at risk. 

American and allied bases are ill-prepared to meet this new threat. As the incursion over Vandenberg showed, it is incredibly difficult to locate small drones violating restricted airspace, even during heightened states of alert. Many major strategic airfields have only a handful of hangars or hardened shelters to house valuable strategic aircraft. During the buildup of American military forces presiding over the attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities this past May, B-2 and B-52 bombers stationed on the joint Anglo-American base on Diego Garcia, located on an island in the Indian Ocean, were parked on the tarmac, despite the risk of drone attack from Iran. Indeed, Operation Spiderweb’s success was largely due to the Russian strategic bombers being out on hardstands rather than in hangars. 

To counter this threat, the United States should invest in both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to defend its major strategic bases. Air Force bases, both at home and abroad, should construct more hangars and hardened shelters to ensure important strategic assets are safe from FPV drone attacks. Jammers and other electronic warfare systems should be deployed in tandem with air defenses specifically designed to counter drones, as well as anti-drone interceptors. Furthermore, the military should coordinate with the NSA and other intelligence agencies, which have existing surveillance power under the PATRIOT Act, to monitor electronic and wireless networks in and around bases during such times of crisis. These systems should be activated when Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) are set to Charlie or Delta, indicating an imminent attack. Electronic warfare systems disrupt all types of electronics, including phones and GPS. Thus, activating these systems only during times of crisis will help limit the impacts electronic warfare systems have on the local population around bases. However, surveillance around bases, whether by patrols, cameras, or friendly drones, should be increased regardless of FPCON. For bases located in foreign countries, the United States should work closely with host nations to ensure the safety and security of its military assets. 

The United States was given a great gift through Operation Spiderweb: we discovered a critical vulnerability without suffering a brutal loss. The Russian military has learned from its own shortcomings that Operation Spiderweb has exposed, and has begun hardening its own airbases and other strategic sites. The United States should follow suit and rapidly strengthen its own critical military facilities.