Putin’s Mini-Armies: The Chechen Kadyrovites

By. Natalie Putz

DOI: 10.57912/28785845

---

In Russian politics' intricate and often brutal landscape, Vladimir Putin has cultivated a network of loyal factions to secure his dominance. One of the most prominent and controversial is the Chechen Kadyrovites, led by Ramzan Kadyrov, Head of the Chechen Republic. Kadyrov's ascension to power in Chechnya was no ordinary political maneuver, it was the result of a personal relationship based on mutual dependence between him and Putin, making Kadyrov a vital player in Putin’s political agenda. However, while the focus is often tilted towards Russian power, Chechnya may soon become a larger player in the international field. Instead of over-focusing on Russia, the United States needs to keep an eye on Chechnya’s moves. Claims that Chechnya may again enter conflict against Russia have gained validity in the past decade. Kadyrov presents a present danger to Western interests and attention must be diverted to watching these smaller factions for exploitable signs of dissent against Russia. NATO and other international organizations should move to exploit potential divisions in the Russian system, like Chechnya and the Kadyrovites, without empowering Chechen fighters to commit additional human rights violations in Eurasia and around the world.

The Kadyrov family's rise to power is deeply tied to Akhmad Kadyrov’s defection from the separatist movement during the Second Chechen War. Initially a key Mufti for the separatists in the First Chechen War, he switched sides in 1999, aligning with Moscow and becoming the Kremlin-backed leader of Chechnya. His assassination in 2004 paved the way for his son, Ramzan. On February 15, 2007, Putin signed a decree that removed the then-president of Chechnya, Alu Alkhanov, and installed Kadyrov as the acting president. He was then reappointed in 2011 as a member of the ruling party, United Russia. In Chechnya, where federal troops have fought two civil wars since the fall of the Soviet Union, United Russia recorded staggering statistics—official results showed 99.5% support and 99.4% voter turnout. These numbers are shocking not only because they come from a region historically less supportive of Moscow but also because they are statistically and politically implausible in any legitimate electoral process. It also highlights Russia’s deep need for public Chechen support of the state.

Kadyrov’s unwavering allegiance to Putin has earned him significant autonomy in Chechnya. Kadyrov refers to himself as Putin's "foot soldier" and receives substantial funding from Moscow, which he reportedly spends with minimal oversight. Moreover, Kadyrov has been granted extensive authority beyond his small republic in return for keeping peace in Chechnya. According to Vadim Dubnov, a Caucasus expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Chechen War in the early 2000s still looms over the Kremlin. "The last thing Moscow needs now is instability in the North Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya." This loyalty was on full display during the 2023 Wagner Group rebellion, when Kadyrov and his forces supported the Russian government, accusing Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin of betrayal.

According to local authorities, the Kadyrov family has reportedly assembled a private army of around 70,000 Chechen fighters. These Kadyrovites have helped advance Putin's policy objectives by providing support in the Ukraine War. Kadyrov voiced support for Putin on his social media, stating that his 10,000 fighters, who have been crucial in Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, "have already deployed to conflict areas" and will "do everything necessary to maintain Russia's unity." Kadyrov's support is not surprising in the present. The real question is what happens once Putin, now 72 years old, is gone. Kadyrov’s power is directly linked to Kremlin backing. Without Putin’s personal support, his position could become far more precarious, potentially leading to Kadrrov’s return to the side of separatist Chechens. For now, though, Kadyrov said his men would continue to fight the “Nazis of Kyiv.”

Kadyrov’s power is marked by extreme brutality especially within his forces, often even more ruthless than the regular Russian army or Wagner paramilitaries. The Kadyrovites have also been implicated in numerous human rights abuses. They have been accused of abducting, torturing, and murdering activists, LGBTQ+ individuals, and those suspected of disloyalty to the regime. In their participation in the Ukraine war, the atrocities only increased. Kadyrov’s forces have been accused of numerous war crimes, including executions, torture, and the targeting of civilians. Kadyrov himself has been accused of orchestrating assassinations of his opponents both within Chechnya and abroad. His operatives have allegedly conducted extrajudicial killings in Grozny, Moscow, and Berlin and even launched a foiled attempt to kill Ukrainian President Zelensky in 2022. According to Al Jazeera Media Network, “Almost a dozen of his political enemies… have been brutally killed,” despite Kadyrov’s denial of any role in their deaths.

Putin’s use of paramilitary groups like the Kadyrovites and Wagner Group shows how he extends his influence beyond conventional military structures, often operating in legal gray areas to achieve political and military objectives. Nevertheless, Putin's political maneuvers might not be our foremost concern. It is crucial that we closely monitor the Chechens because their strategic maneuvers and alliances have significant implications for regional stability and security. Looking ahead, many suspect that Kadyrov aims for Chechnya to break away from Russia after Putin's demise. In 2008, during Russia's conflict with Georgia, a Chechen officer was asked, "Hey… who are you fighting for?" The officerresponded, "For Russians. For now.”

Kadyrov's ambitions to prepare his army for potential conflicts in Russia indicate a shift in power dynamics that could lead to internal strife and further geopolitical tension. Understanding their actions and motivations is essential for anticipating and responding to future challenges that may arise from their involvement in broader conflicts. The Kadyrovites have been involved in various wars, including the Second Chechen War, the Syrian Civil War, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As their history has shown, their participation has had lasting impacts, making it vital to stay vigilant and informed about their current activities and potential plans. Western countries must divert some attention to watching these smaller factions for signs of dissent against Russia as it could cause further issues for the international community. Kadyrov's actions have already had the potential to destabilize neighboring regions, as seen in his involvement in Uzbekistan.

Some countries have already worked to limit Kadyrov’s impact. On December 10, 2020, the United States imposed sanctions on several companies and individuals associated with Kadyrov, citing the "gross human rights violations." Implementing targeted sanctions against key figures within the Kadyrovites and their financial networks can help limit their resources and ability to operate effectively. The challenge lies in dismantling the Kadyrovites' influence without creating a power vacuum that could lead to further instability in the North Caucasus. While targeted sanctions can restrict their financial and operational capabilities, a more strategic approach would involve exploiting the existing tensions between Kadyrov and the Kremlin. Kadyrov’s loyalty to Putin is largely transactional rooted in financial support and autonomy over Chechnya. If Moscow perceives him as a liability rather than an asset, it could weaken his standing and disrupt his network.

Despite the Kadyrovites’ brutality, their internal divisions present an opportunity. Some Kadyrovite officials have already expressed dissent with the Russian Federation. By using Russia's vulnerabilities, including weak points in Chechnya, and applying strategic pressure points, the U.S. may be able to make the Kadyrovites more of a liability for Russia than a source of stability. Limiting the Kadyrovites could curb some of Russia’s influence abroad. NATO countries could offer asylum, financial incentives, or security guarantees to Kadyrovite officials willing to defect or provide intelligence. Leaking or amplifying internal frustrations among Kadyrov’s men, such as economic disparities, favoritism, or dissatisfaction with Moscow, could widen existing cracks. Spreading paranoia within Kadyrov’s inner circle could create fractures, leading to purges or internal instability. Even keeping a spotlight on Kadyrov’s abuses, especially through international bodies like the UN, raises the cost of Russia’s support. If Moscow believes Kadyrov is too independent or costly to control, it may begin sidelining him.

At the same time, the international community must be cautious. If Kadyrov’s forces lose Kremlin backing but remain heavily armed and autonomous, they could evolve into a rogue faction, exacerbating regional instability. This means that any effort to counter Kadyrov’s influence should be paired with initiatives to strengthen legitimate governance structures in Chechnya and ensure that extremist elements do not exploit the situation. A comprehensive approach, one that combines economic pressure, intelligence operations, and diplomatic engagement, can help contain Kadyrov’s influence while promoting long-term stability in the North Caucasus. By carefully managing these efforts, the international community can not only curb Kadyrov’s reach but also weaken Russia’s broader geopolitical leverage.