An Analysis of Cross-Strait Relations: Escalation in Focus

By. Baxter Katz

DOI. 10.57912/30337138

---

In 2024, Chinese villagers, with the backing of the Chinese government, began moving into the territory of the small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan in clear violation of international law. For Taiwan, the takeaway is clear: Beijing escalates to get what it wants. One of the key goals of the Communist Party of China is reunification with Taiwan, and while it has many options to achieve that goal, escalation may be the most attractive one. Escalation can be described as escalating engagement with a country to pressure that country to accept your demands. It can also be a tool to test a country’s resolve. However, to make Taiwan amenable to Chinese demands, the Chinese first need to gauge America’s resolve. Thus, when looking at Asia more broadly,  aggression anywhere by the PRC is dangerous to Taiwan so long as the U.S. response is mute. Taking this fact into consideration, the U.S.’s future response should be fairly straightforward: always respond proportionally to Chinese escalations wherever they occur. For this reason, U.S. policymakers should recognize that what happens in one part of Asia reverberates in the straits. Chinese escalations in the South China Sea, Myanmar, or the Himalayas are relevant for cross-strait dynamics because the PRC’s success or failure in these endeavors will determine the way the PRC leadership will approach Taiwan. 

In 1949, the KMT (Kuomintang) Party, which had ruled China since 1928, retreated to Taiwan following its defeat in the Chinese Civil War, establishing a rival Chinese government to Beijing in Taipei. In 1988 Taiwan began transitioning towards democracy, an outcome that shifted Taiwanese identity. Politics, once controlled exclusively by the Mainlanders, suddenly became open to the majority of the pre-1949 Taiwanese population, who brought their own anti-reunification discourse to the fore. The importance of such a shift is that the struggle between Taiwan and China suddenly became a struggle for Mainland Chinese domination over a people that increasingly did not define themselves as Chinese. Separatism, once suppressed by the KMT, had become the raison d’être for the PRC’s provocations against the island.

Since 1988, those living in Taiwan have leaned towards identifying themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. For China, this is a much more precarious position, largely because a shrinking of Chinese identity in Taiwan means less interest in unification and a stronger urge towards resistance to any attempts at domination. A more likely plan of attack will include the separation of three things: (1) U.S. support for Taiwan, (2) the degradation of Taiwan’s democratic political system, and (3) the demoralization of the Taiwanese people. The PRC, being a one-party dictatorship, is more resistant to domestic pressure, and Taiwan's main backer, the United States, is currently going through a time of deep division. For this reason, the only move that may be required for the PRC now is to convince America it is willing to use force and to convince Taiwan that America will do nothing in response. The centerpiece of achieving this requires implementing the aforementioned escalation strategy, meaning that, in practice, China will continue to test American resolve in Asia. This could manifest as violations of other countries' sovereignty in the region, such as what China is currently doing in the South China Sea. A lack of American reaction to these actions is a strong signal that the U.S. is not committed to protecting the territorial sovereignty of its allies, such as Taiwan.

If China doesn’t anticipate U.S. intervention, it will warm towards military action, and Taiwan will feel even more insecure. Insecurity could further lead to the degradation of Taiwan’s political system, especially since one of the key propaganda lines from Beijing centers on  convincing Taiwan that America will not come to its aid, a statement that will only gain credibility if America withdraws its support. This has the added negative consequence of making other U.S. partners believe in the need for rearmament, which will end the peace dividend that has helped make countries like Japan so successful. At the same time, it will deter other countries in the region from pursuing democratic reforms, given the risks those reforms could pose to national security. Ultimately, the U.S. security blanket not only maintains peace in the straits but also contributes to maintaining peace in the region, benefiting both Taipei and Washington. However, unlike with NATO, America's obligation to these countries is implied rather than written. Thus, America has to be vigilant to shore up the vaguer guarantees we have with our Asian allies.

Ultimately, within the three-way dynamic of cross-strait relations, America has the most shifting role to play. Both China and Taiwan have maintained approximately the same position over the last 12 years. America, however, has maintained a somewhat more confused foreign policy. Recent administrations have simultaneously become more hawkish on China whilst being more or less mute towards the rest of Asia, especially towards Beijing's less well-known actions in South and Southeast Asia, such as its support for Myanmar’s military in the midst of its civil war or its seizure of territory from the small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. U.S. disinterest in any of these areas is a green flag to China that the U.S. has no great concern in Asian security. Thus, the proper response to even seemingly minor provocations by the PRC must be decisive U.S. actions, lest minor provocations give way to larger ones. 

In practice, this means working with our Asian allies in a coordinated fashion on sanctions as well as coordinated military support for states, large and small, under threat from China. Sanctions should center on cutting off China from resources necessary for the military supply chain. Notably this will include micro-chips as well certain metals like copper, which China imports a disproportionate amount from other East Asian states. Thus, an important piece of this strategy will include bringing in a wide array of Asian states who can contribute towards applying pressure to Chinese supply chains. While this strategy is not opposed to bringing players outside Asia, it is the Asian states who have the most to lose with escalation, thus coordinating their actions must be of priority. Further, sanctions, or military aid should scale with Chinese escalations and be reduced or accelerated in accordance with Chinese action.

Today, the lack of U.S. action towards these genuine violations is a worrying signal that U.S.-China policy is driven more by domestic issues than serious concern for partners in the region. All this bodes poorly for Taiwan, as these gradual escalations (and the lack of a U.S. response to them) could serve as a barometer for U.S. commitment to Asia. So far, that commitment has been lacking.

Protecting Taiwan is not a policy that can be done in isolation. Instead, it must be paired with a robust program across Asia that ensures America keeps up its commitment to defend sovereignty and democracy against potential Chinese aggression anywhere. It doesn’t matter if the provocation occurs in the South China Sea, the Himalayas, or Southeast Asia. Each time China goes unpunished for its actions, it decreases faith in America in Taiwan and emboldens China. Therefore, if the U.S. wants peace in the Strait, the U.S. needs to demonstrate strength throughout Asia.