How Ethiopia's Search for a Port is Disrupting the Horn of Africa

By. Mason Scaggs

DOI. 10.57912/31847965

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In September of 2025, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali claimed that it was “only a matter of time" before Ethiopia  regained coastal access and that a “mistake (was) made three decades ago” during the referendum that gave Eritrea independence. In response, Eritrea rebuked the statements, calling them “reckless saber-rattling”. Ethiopia’s persistent search for port access now threatens to bring the whole Horn of Africa under conflict. 2024’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia, for a period of time, seemed to offer a diplomatic resolution to the tensions posed between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia by granting Ethiopia an alternative access to the sea, and it still has the potential to do so. In Somaliland, there is currently a crisis over its status on the world stage: it runs itself as independent, but fails to be recognized as such, with only major representation from Israel, occurring in late 2025, and is still seen as a part of Somalia. Therefore, for there to be true lasting peace in the Horn, there must be a solution that recognizes Somaliland, which will allow Ethiopia to peacefully negotiate access to the sea. 

Ethiopia is a landlocked nation, but it wasn’t always. This East African nation once had a port in Eritrea after World War II, but lost it following a defeat in a thirty-year-long war with the coastal country. Now, with their rhetoric becoming much more harsh and direct, Ethiopia is trying to regain sea access. It has limited access through Djibouti now, but it comes at a high cost due to fees that occur from port usage and customs. Ethiopia's solution to gain port access through Somaliland has the potential to stop future conflict in the region, even though it has received pushback from certain states. Somaliland is a region that governs itself as an independent nation, but it is still seen on the world stage as being controlled by Somalia. Nevertheless, the government in Somaliland believes that it should have the ability to make its own deals, including with its ports.

In January of 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed an MOU, in which President Muse Bihi Abdi of Somaliland stated that the two had agreed to a 50 year lease of 19 kilometers of coastal access to the Ethiopian Navy. It also provided for future recognition of Somaliland by Ethiopia as a sovereign nation. The immediate reaction was intense, with the Somali government condemning it after an emergency cabinet meeting and severing diplomatic ties with Ethiopia. Ethiopia's attempt to blindside Somalia by negotiating and announcing an agreement with Somaliland has backfired, with numerous condemnations. Rising tensions led to Turkey stepping in to try to broker an agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia. In December of 2024, the Ankara Agreement was signed, restoring diplomatic ties. Ambiguity in the wording, however, has allowed Somaliland to claim the deal is still in effect, as the wording only states an agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia with no mention of Somaliland. 

The original MOU arose from Somaliland's desperate need for allies and recognition in the region, leading it to be willing to give up land in exchange. Furthermore, Ethiopia's effort to build a port in Somaliland has alienated its neighbors, with whom it already has a fragile relationship. This has led to Ethiopia coming away with almost nothing in exchange due to the fear of retaliation if it decides to re-engage with Somaliland under the current format. The situation has also seen Somalia move closer to Ethiopia's two main rivals in Egypt and Eritrea, with Egypt now selling weapons to Somalia, and Egypt and Eritrea forming an alliance. Somalia has moved towards them as a method of security, with both of them being strongly against giving Ethiopia a port, due to, in Egypt's case, the Ethiopian River dam and in Eritrea's case, the brutal civil war that occurred in the 1990s between the two nations.  With the ambiguity of the Ankara agreement, the issue of the MOU and Ethiopia's port situation may be far from over.

A more coordinated response in the future, though, leaves open the possibility for future agreements between Ethiopia and Somaliland, due in part to the ambiguity of the Ankara agreement. A more calculated effort where Ethiopia could build upon Israel’s recognition, which is the majorly recognized nation to recognize Somaliland, and get more states to recognize Somaliland, would dampen Somalia's claim on the world stage and give Somaliland more power to act independently. In allowing Ethiopia to establish ports on its land, Somaliland would gain more trade opportunities and a much-needed source of revenue, and Ethiopia would once again gain access to the seas and world maritime trade, greatly helping its economy. Until Somaliland has autonomy, reaching an agreement will be extremely difficult, with Somalia wanting to downplay the regional independence of Somaliland.

While this issue does not have one clear-cut answer, one solution that has the ability to provide positive effects for multiple actors can be implemented to assist the situation. A major problem is Somaliland, which is de facto independent, but un-recognized, though this has been changing with Israel recognizing it in December of 2025. A possible plan is to see the region become independent through a referendum, which would allow the people to democratically demonstrate to the world their willingness to be an independent state. Ethiopia could support this ballot initiative and try to convince its opposition that an agreement with Somaliland is better than the potential for a future war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which is continuously growing, as long as Ethiopia does not have port access. This would give the people of Somaliland the ability to decide for themselves and see their de facto independent government recognized and respected on the world stage. The agreement would allow Somaliland to lease land to Ethiopia and for Somaliland to receive support from Ethiopia, ultimately giving Ethiopia the port access it desires and Somaliland the money it needs, and is the most feasible option. The solution must be implemented for there to be a peaceful Horn, but until Ethiopia gains access to the sea, the region will remain unstable.