The Iranian Nuclear Program: Not Quite Obliterated

By: Vladimir Kovtun

Despite Iran’s long-lasting proxy wars with Israel, before this summer, both sides were deterred from conducting open warfare, measuring responses within crises to prevent escalation. By breaking this pattern in the Iran-Israel War, the U.S. and Israel have simultaneously removed Iran’s conventional deterrence and decreased its trust in negotiations. Iran’s inability to prevent Israel from gaining aerial supremacy or killing leading generals has shown considerable military weakness. The war appears to have galvanized Iran’s population against the U.S. and Israel, with even dissidents turning against Israel due to acts like the bombing of the notorious Evin Prison. While the U.S. and Israel may have succeeded in damaging Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, its consequences have not stopped Iran from rebuilding its nuclear program. In this difficult diplomatic situation, the U.S. needs to intensify its efforts to monitor Iran’s nuclear program and work towards a new nuclear deal to prevent Iran from making the very choices the Iran-Israel War was meant to avoid.

Iran is unlikely to take a deal in the short run. The war clearly changed the Iranian position on negotiations, as Tehran has suspended its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the sole impartial means for the international community to gauge if Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons. Any continued efforts to gather information will have to come from the American intelligence community, which poses a transparency problem. Furthermore, as the U.S. kept up appearances of negotiations until Israel’s attack, it undermined Iran’s overall trust in negotiations, complicating any future moves towards a deal. Finally, Iran has been clear that it will not give up on enrichment, with Foreign Minister Araghchi calling it “a matter of national pride”. This seeming red line from Iran directly contradicts the U.S. firm stance against any nuclear enrichment, placing both sides at an impasse. Especially given Iran’s disadvantaged position in negotiations, its stances seem to support the view that it no longer considers talks its primary option for achieving its goals. However, Iran has also stated it has not engaged in enrichment since the war, since too many of its nuclear facilities were destroyed, providing a means to accept a deal ending enrichment entirely. Their statement notably does not include a statement stating they will not restart enrichment, important given that they are actively building facilities which could be used for enrichment in the future.

 Iran still maintains the ability to become a nuclear threat in the medium-term future. Despite the damage incurred to Iran’s nuclear facilities, Rafael Grossi of the IAEA estimates that roughly 400 kg of near weapons-grade uranium survived the war. Most worryingly, there are indications that Iran has continued developing the site “Pickaxe Mountain”, meant for producing centrifuges needed for enriching more uranium. As such, it is clear that until Iran’s core motivation to maintain the option of developing nuclear weapons is resolved, the crisis will continue.

Iran is still a mostly rational state actor that is unlikely to launch a preemptive attack on Israel. Its past behavior in the aftermath of General Soleimani’s assassination, its 2024 clashes with Israel, and the resolution of the Iran-Israel War indicate a tendency to de-escalate crises rather than choose a full-scale war. However, there are two reasons why it would be dangerous for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Firstly, Iran is at a higher risk of destabilization than most current nuclear powers, being in the midst of a severe economic crisis and home to active separatist groups. Combined with political instability seen in incidents like the death of President Raisi, this risk is simply unacceptable from the perspective of global security. Secondly, Iran’s competitors, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, have indicated that they will acquire nuclear weapons of their own if Iran continues to develop its own. This will provide an unacceptable proliferation risk, ensuring that any forthcoming Middle Eastern crisis will become a nuclear standoff and greatly raise the stakes of any political upheavals in the mentioned countries. These risks are simply unacceptable to global security.

A negotiated agreement would undeniably be the best outcome for all parties involved. Yet, due to the effects of the war, the U.S. will likely need to provide concessions to Iran for negotiations to succeed. One option that stands out would be for the U.S. to compromise on its demand for zero enrichment. Demanding zero enrichment, on top of violating the NPT’s provision of a state’s right to have a nuclear energy program, is simply excessive. Given the major technical leap between the 3-5% enrichment needed to operate a nuclear power plant and the 90% enrichment needed for weaponization, the U.S. does not need to extract the difficult concession of Iran completely dismantling its nuclear power program to prevent weaponization. Concerns that Iran would exploit limited enrichment are valid. However,  the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) allowed for limited enrichment, and Iran remained compliant until President Trump withdrew from it. This concession may not be ideal from a U.S. perspective, but given the JCPOA's precedent of success, the benefits will outweigh the political costs.

Israel will undoubtedly oppose a new Iranian deal in the same mould as the JCPOA. Israel has firmly opposed any Iranian enrichment, seeing it as a fundamental threat to their security, and it maintains their right to unilaterally strike Iranian facilities. With Israel’s motivation, it may seem as if a new deal could simply push them to unilaterally act against Iran. However, under the Obama Administration, the U.S. was able to dissuade Israel from launching an attack under similar circumstances, mainly by continually demonstrating its commitment to preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon and remaining transparent about the U.S.’s strategy to do so. This mainly included measures such as presenting Israel with a concrete timeline as to how much time the U.S. would allot to talks before reverting to sanctions, if need be. Even with a more aggressive Israel, in the context of an Israel already under economic strain due to a lasting war, these measures should be sufficient to prevent a new outbreak of violence.

The U.S. has placed itself in a position where Iran is unlikely to accept its terms and will thus need to deal with new rules of engagement. As such, U.S. policymakers should not let themselves become complacent in the aftermath of the Iran-Israel war. They will need to provide greater resources toward gathering intelligence from the Iranian program to prevent Iran from secretly building a nuclear bomb. As Iran has announced it will no longer cooperate with the IAEA, U.S. intelligence agencies will be the only truly reliable source for lawmakers to discern if Iran is trying to construct nuclear weapons. Despite all of this, the U.S. should continue to pursue a nuclear deal. Even though under the current circumstances a deal is less likely to succeed, it is ultimately the only method that has been proven to stop Iran from attempting to develop nuclear weapons capabilities. Ultimately, the war showed that the military solution failed to deal Iran’s nuclear ambition a strategic blow, so a complicated road to peace is preferable to an endless cycle of conflict.