Right from Wrong: Why the Left Can’t Keep up with Europe’s Far-Right

By. Martina Sordi

DOI. 10.57912/33411436

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Europe is shifting; in fact, it has been for years. Over the past decade, and especially in the last few years, the political balance of power in Europe has shifted towards the right. The election of Italy's Giorgia Meloni in 2022 marked the first significant turning point in the rise of far-right dominance in Europe. In last year's European Parliament elections, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Brothers of Italy party, achieved an all-time high in the polls, garnering around 28% of the support. As of May 2024, 6 of the 27 countries in the European Union have far-right parties in charge of the government. The recent national elections also saw an increase in far-right parties leading in state polls, particularly in Germany, Austria, and France, with the latter pushing President Macron to dissolve parliament and call for new snap elections. It is clear that Europe has and will keep moving right, but what is its strategy, and why has the left not been able to keep up? One can argue that migration and economic crisis are the leading causes of the shift to the right; however, the change is much more structural. In simple terms, Europeans have grown tired of the false promises and instability of left-wing governments. For the European left to reclaim the trust of its voters and compete with a unified far-right, it must build the strong, organized party structure that has long fueled its opposition’s success.  The rise of modern right-wing parties has swept a new wave of populism into Europe to an extent not seen since the end of World War II. In 2022, Italy shocked Europe by electing a far-right coalition with an overwhelming 44.2% of the vote, 20% higher than the countering left coalition. In February of 2025, Germany's Olaf Scholz’s Center-Left Social Democratic Party received 16.4% of the votes, compared to the 28.6% obtained by Federich Merz’s Center-Right Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU) conservative alliance. Furthermore, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) gained its highest result to date, with 20.8% of the vote.

The reasons behind the rise of Italy's far-right were not so different from those in Germany. Italy's far-right coalition beat the sitting Partito Democratico party (PD), which had led the government for the last ten years. While their views and proposed policies, particularly on immigration, won them much popular support, their biggest asset was the PD itself. Unlike the far-right coalition made up of Brothers of Italy, Lega, and Forza Italia, which had united behind a single candidate, their rivals on the left and center could not organize or consolidate on a common position. Following the fall of Mario Draghi’s 18-month government, the left was unable to build a broad coalition with other political parties to challenge the strong far-right coalition, and supporters and officials on the left had little hope before the election.

In February 2025, Germany saw its largest voter turnout in over 40 years, and many young voters aged 18 to 34 were part of this turnout. The most striking part, however, was how they voted: the majority of the young vote went to the extremes (left and right) while the older vote stuck to the center, with the AfD coming out on top among the 18-34 age bracket. The AfD dominates the eastern region of Germany, while the CDU/CSU alliance dominates in the west. The success of the AfD in the east is largely due to the older population of Germans in the east, who are still politically driven by the values that existed while Germany was still separated. While both parties retained a majority in their respective regions, the CDU/CSU lost more than 1 million votes to the AfD nationwide in the recent election. This election, like the one in Italy a few years prior, was the first major far-right victory in decades. Social media was a powerful asset that helped the AfD, led by Alice Weidel, sway young voters towards the far-right.

The German elections followed Chancellor Olaf Scholz's coalition collapse after three years of constant infighting. Before the elections, Scholz's party was polling at around 17 percent, approximately half of what the conservatives were expected to win by. Since its founding 12 years ago, the AfD has grown into the second-largest party in Germany, gaining massive support in the recent election, second only to Merz's CDU/CSU coalition. The German situation closely resembles the patterns that led to Italy's far-right elections two years earlier: a weak left and an even stronger right. The German and Italian cases are not exclusive; throughout Europe, there have been significant shifts in left party dominance. In Austria, the far-right Freedom Party won 29% of the vote, its best-ever result, and in Portugal, the far-right Chega party won 50 out of 230 parliamentary seats. France is another key example of how left-wing infighting and internal divisions within the party are slowly allowing the right to gain power. The Macron government's inability to organize has led to the resignation of multiple prime ministers since the snap elections in June of 2024. With Marie Le Pen and the National Rally party pulling significant numbers in the last French elections, we can only predict that their numbers will only grow in the next elections, particularly with the rising popularity of Jordan Bardella as a potential candidate in the 2027 Presidential election.

The cases of Germany and Italy have not only demonstrated that they have both the means and tools to win over established left-wing governments. So what should the left-wing parties do? Right-wing parties have gained support through several means; however, the biggest factor is party organization. Party organization in this context can be defined as the ability of the party to: A. mobilize and bring together supporters, and B. reach consensus on which candidate to back during an election year. Looking at the case studies of Italy and Germany, we see both features implemented within the conservative parties. In Italy, the far-right coalition was a fully unified front with one unanimous candidate emerging from the three parties. In Germany, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria had united into a coalition that rallied behind a single candidate once the election was completed. In Italy, internal instability and the lack of agreement behind forming a united coalition led many of their historical voters to move towards the right, which in turn led to a lower number of mobilization of support by the left. By presenting themselves as a unified coalition, both Brothers of Italy and CDU/CSU were able to reassure voters that they would be voting for an organized government, something that their opponents were not able to portray.

Strong party organization is critical to creating a strong government, and far-right parties have shown that they are capable of properly unifying. If the left wants to have a chance at competing with the right in the future, particularly in the cases of Germany and Italy, then they need to become that unified front, and by doing so, they will then be able to finally deliver on all their promises to their voters. When organization happens, then the left can work on catching up with the right in all areas, whether it's re-gaining the young vote, maintaining influence in key regional areas, and standing united among the international political landscape. When all of these factors fall into place, then the left will have done right, and they will once again be able to keep up with the opposition.