Shame About the Hypersonics: Why the United States Needs More Missile Defenses in the Indo-Pacific
By. Diego Arrendondo
DOI. 10.57912/34692192
On September 3, 2025, China held a Victory Day Parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. As is done annually, the display unveiled a range of new weapons, including laser defense systems, a stealth fighter, and missiles, signaling a modernization of China’s military that will force a change in U.S. posture and operations in the Pacific. The new weapons will expand China’s strike-force capabilities to include both the First and Second Island Chains in the Indo-Pacific, two U.S.-aligned arcs of archipelagos including Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines in the First, and Guam and other strategic islands in the Second. The American military facilities on these island chains allow the U.S. to project its forces in the Pacific, enabling it to deter and respond to opposing forces quickly, restrict Chinese naval access, and form a defensive barrier. With China’s modernization of its military and shifting approach to Pacific hegemony, the U.S. should increase its anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its bases in Guam, South Korea, and Japan, and reassure its allies of its continued capability of stabilizing the region.
Military analysts and defense officials widely agree that the main purpose of China’s evolving weapons systems is to counter U.S. military assets, especially the U.S. naval hegemony in the region. Beijing also understands that in the era where drones can overwhelm traditional defenses, a rapid and cost-effective response is critical. The Liaoyuan-1(LY-1) was one of the weapons on display designed for this purpose. It is intended for shipboard self-defense, specifically to disrupt and destroy optical sensors of enemy platforms that detect drones and missiles. Direct-energy weapons (DEW) like the LY-1 offer near-instant engagement at a low cost per shot, providing a financial advantage and an efficient means of countering saturated volumes of incoming threats.
All of these expanding weapons capabilities showcase China’s ambition to be seen as a leader among military powers and challenge American hegemony. The most significant and worrying are the hypersonic missiles, most notably the Yingji 21 and DongFeng-26D (DF-26). The Yingji 21 can reach a terminal velocity of roughly Mach 10, making it difficult for missile-defense systems to intercept and earning it the title of an “aircraft carrier killer.” The base DF-26 is an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) designed to deliver conventional and nuclear strikes. The “D” variant specifically has a 5,000-kilometer strike radius, making it able to hit Guam, an important military base for the United States. These new weapons highlight a central gap in the current U.S. defensive posture in the Indo-Pacific by sending a signal that Beijing not only intends to match the U.S. in stealth but also in navy force projection.
Against this growing threat, the U.S. and its regional allies need to rely on layered missile-defense systems to strengthen deterrence and to counter potential attacks. At this moment, Guam has a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, each with 6 launchers and 8 interceptors per launcher, capable of intercepting missiles in their terminal phase. South Korea additionally has one THAAD battery in Seongju, positioned to defend both Seoul and US troops in the Port of Busan. While Japan does not have a battery, its defenses consist of 8 Aegis BMD ships, with five U.S. Aegis BMD ships permanently stationed in Japan. Defending all three of these territories is critical for the U.S. to manage the region and its global credibility because together, they serve as a multi-tiered system strategically important to the U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific.
The U.S. should increase its land-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (ABMD) facilities and its THAAD in Guam, South Korea, and Japan. A layered missile defense increases the probability of intercept by creating multiple engagement windows. While it does not make defended regions invulnerable, it does raise the number of missiles required to achieve a successful hit, thereby lowering the cost-benefit ratio of an attack for China. Complicating the missiles’ reach deters China from employing missiles by reducing confidence in the ability to achieve reliable effects. However, the United States should also develop more cost-effective countermeasures, as it costs the U.S. about $1 billion for a THAAD battery, about $13 million for each interceptor, and $637 million to deploy an Aegis Ashore.
Increasing ABMD and THAAD presence in Guam is essential because it provides the U.S. with a gateway to Asia, as it is home to important Navy and Air Force bases that support the Air Force’s heavy bomber force, nuclear-powered submarines, the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and all long-range aircraft. Unlike the sea-based Aegis destroyers, which must divide time between escort and maintenance cycles, a land-based Aegis Ashore site provides continuous coverage. Similarly, enhancing South Korea's defenses is critical because of the US bases located within its borders. South Korea currently operates 8 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) systems and its own MDS known as the Korean Air and Missile Defense; both systems have a short range and cannot effectively engage IRBMs, giving opposing forces the possibility to neutralize U.S. bases and air operations. If the ROK Armed Forces are not able to delay opposing forces due to missiles, it will allow the enemy to neutralize U.S. bases, delaying U.S. reinforcements and disrupting air operations. In addition to holding 50,000 U.S. military personnel and the only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, the USS Geroge Washington, Japan also maintains 6 destroyers, 5 of which are permanently-stationed, one cruiser equipped with 13 Aegis BMD destroyers, and U.S.-operated PAC-3 systems in Okinawa. That being said, U.S. vessels or Japanese destroyers cannot be counted on to defend Japan if conflict breaks out, as ships would likely prioritize protecting U.S. carrier strike groups. Deploying Aegis Ashore batteries in Japan will keep U.S. bases protected, freeing up ships to protect the USS George Washington, conduct patrols, and perform maintenance.
Although expanding layered missile defense would strengthen the U.S. ability to protect its forces in the Indo-Pacific, advocating for this policy is unlikely to be politically or economically feasible in the near term. The Iran War has shown that American missile defense is too costly and has drained that stockpile as well. Making a large expansion of missile defense in the Indo-Pacific more difficult to sustain. Domestically, the American public does not want to spend more on the military budget. Washington has also reduced the scale of some U.S.-South Korean military exercises. Japan is more favorable to military buildup, as its government has continued to increase defense spending and invested in missile defense, drones, and other capabilities. The United States should instead develop cheaper defensive technologies, investing in laser technology or other cost-effective countermeasures.
With the growing threat of China’s advancing military, the U.S. should consider focusing missile defense system expansion on strategic bases critical for combating Chinese regional influence. Guam, South Korea, and Japan are vital to the US for these reasons in stabilizing and maintaining its presence in the region. Additionally, placing defense systems in both Korea and Japan would reassure allies of the U.S.’s continued capability to defend against encroaching Chinese airstrike capabilities. Deploying defense systems to these three locations will allow the United States to strengthen its naval deterrence as China continues to challenge the U.S.-led international order.
Comments