The ‘A-10-ification’ of the Tank

By. Theodore Pellicano

DOI. 10.57912/31449580

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In the 1990s, Air Force Chief of Staff John Jumper referred to a sub-30-minute kill chain (the process required to identify and neutralize a target) as “lucky”. In Ukraine, however, it takes only three minutes for an infantry squad to call in a strike to destroy a Russian T-72 using a first-person view (FPV) assault drone. The unprecedented speed of this engagement is forcing analysts to rethink how the tank will be used in a near-peer conflict and its survivability in its current capacity. It serves a critical ground support role, but remains vulnerable due to an outdated doctrine designed for massed maneuver rather than information-based warfare. This is not the first time the United States has had to reconcile doctrine with reality. The ongoing debate about the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II (A-10) attack aircraft highlights many of the same issues and may provide direction for solutions. As battlefield threats continue to evolve, the ongoing A-10 debate provides a useful framework for understanding how armored warfare must adapt to increase survivability and what that adaptation must look like.

During the Cold War, the A-10 and the tank had similar doctrinal roles in different operational environments; both relied on firepower and armor for survivability and success in direct-fire support missions. When the Cold War ended, and the United States entered conflicts in the Middle East, the A-10 faced a new threat: precision smart weapons and contemporary air defense systems. These technologies exploited the A-10’s doctrine of exposed, low-flying, direct fire missions, which reduced the A-10’s survivability and, therefore, its effectiveness in its role. Rather than abandoning the platform, the U.S. Air Force modified the A-10’s doctrine to rely more on standoff engagements, focusing on survivability through precision and sensor integration to mitigate unnecessary exposure. The U.S. Air Force did not remove the A-10 platform, but modified its doctrine to account for the changes in its combat environment.

Contemporary near-peer conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that tanks must follow a similar evolution. The 2022 full Russian invasion of Ukraine (which prioritized penetrating defenses through a Cold War tactic using mass and momentum) left the unmaneuverable tank columns exposed to repeated rapid strikes; in the initial 7 months of the invasion, Russia lost 1000 tanks and tank crews. Similarly, the threat of FPV assault drones exploits a tank doctrine that isn't built to support a multi-dimensional (horizontal and vertical plane of attack) threat environment. Despite this, tanks remain viable in combat when shifted away from traditional doctrine. In the Ukrainian conflict, tanks are often adapted to operate as mobile heavy shock units, forcing an adversary to divert resources to protect against them and creating gaps in adversarial formations that infantry can exploit. Building upon this, when territory has been taken, tanks, unlike drones, can reinforce the infantry’s defensive presence. This demonstrates the combined-arms potential of contemporary warfare; a tank’s unique value emerges when used alongside other ground elements. The challenges facing tanks today are not inherent to the platform itself but stem from outdated tank doctrine. 

These lessons must be codified into a new, coherent doctrine that improves survivability and accounts for the demands of contemporary conflict, specifically tailored to the tank. The A-10 doctrine focused on removing itself from operating within the adversary’s engagement zone by using modern standoff munition technology, mitigating its exposure to contemporary weapons. By contrast, tanks must operate within an adversary's engagement zone to remain effective in their role. Reinterpreting the A-10’s lesson, therefore, means taking what is applicable — technological integration — and building upon proven doctrine in contemporary conflict. This new doctrine must shift the tank towards a system where maneuverability, awareness, and effectiveness mutually reinforce survivability.

The tank must be integrated with combined arms communication and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) networks to avoid unnecessary threats and maintain an advantage on the battlefield. A report by the U.S. Army concluded that armored units integrated into a communications network “could process faster fire missions from sensor-to-shooter”, allowing for reduced kill chain time. This would reduce a tank's exposure during combat, minimizing an adversary's reaction time to initiate its own kill chain, making the tank harder to target, enhancing its survivability, and improving mission success under this doctrine. Communication and ISR networks also enable the combination of each unit’s battlefield assessments to create a broader operational picture, providing command units with a greater understanding of the battlefield to prevent unnecessary risks to vulnerable platforms. These are the mechanisms by which tanks would transition to information-driven warfare and operate proactively.

With faster reaction times enabled by connectivity, tanks must also be able to execute autonomous rapid strikes, building on the naturally evolved heavy shock unit strategy. French warfare doctrine prioritizes a similar concept of “fast movement … and subsidiarity (meaning the practice of authorizing subordinate unit commanders to act autonomously)”. In contemporary conflict, decision-making time must match the battlefield’s “tempo”. Autonomy provides units with the ability to compress decision-making time, reducing unit exposure in the critical minutes where they are vulnerable to an adversaries kill chain. This doctrine minimizes a tank's time on the battlefield, reducing fatal exposure and increasing platform survivability. Through rapid strike doctrine and autonomy, the U.S. military can ensure tanks respond quickly to combat while minimizing their exposure. 

Finally, a contemporary near-peer conflict would include a multinational joint force. This requires American military strategists to work with allied nations and international defense contractors to coordinate innovation — whether doctrinal or technical — through joint procurement, exercises, and communication networks. This would build inter-alliance coordination and integrate the tank into the communication and ISR networks of a multilateral fighting force, expanding the tank's capability and survivability beyond the American military. 

With kill chains spanning several minutes, battlefield roles must act quickly and proactively to remain survivable; however, directly removing a platform also eliminates an essential capability. The A-10 builds upon this lesson: survivability through innovation is about adapting a combat role to the specific battlefield’s demands. To adapt to contemporary conflict, the tank must integrate into the communication and ISR networks of contemporary warfare, enhancing situational awareness and building an information-driven force. Connectivity, however, must be paired with rapid strike doctrine and autonomy to compress fatal decision-making time and exposure to adversarial retaliation. Technological innovation must be the driving strength of American-led multinational doctrinal change to maintain battlefield advantage, keep platforms survivable, and become an information-driven international force. These adaptations to contemporary warfare must happen now, not after the next near-peer conflict exposes a vulnerability that causes thousands to die preventable deaths.